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 PRIVATE SECTOR CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: 
THE NEED FOR HEIGHTENED REPORTING AND A PRIVATE 
RIGHT OF ACTION IN THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES 
ACT 
 
Nika A. Antonikova 
 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The World Bank estimates that bribery, one form of corruption, costs 
the world’s economies about one trillion dollars annually.1 Even beyond 
this tremendous figure lie costs related to theft and embezzlement, lost 
investments, and corruption between private companies.2 Corruption is 
an elusive term that is difficult to define because it has numerous 
manifestations and cultural nuances.3 For the purposes of this Comment, 
corruption is defined as the “abuse or misuse of a position of trust or 
responsibility for private gain rather than for the purpose for which that 
trust or responsibility is conferred.”4  
For years, corruption in the private sector was overlooked or 
downplayed by scholars and the public because it was assumed that 
corruption in the public sector was more damaging to the public interest 
and, therefore, constituted a more serious offense. 5  As a result, even 
though the idea of regulating commercial bribery has been around since 
at least 1922, it has yet to translate into effective legislation.6 Today, 
however, new quantitative and qualitative research illuminates the high 
costs of private sector corruption 7  and suggests that the problem is 
almost as pervasive as corruption in the public sector.8                                                           
1  See, e.g., Six Questions on the Cost of Corruption with World Bank Institute Global 
Governance Director Daniel Kaufmann, THE WORLD BANK (2013), 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20190295~menuPK:34457
~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html. 
2 Id. 
3 Philip M. Nichols, The Business Case for Complying with Bribery Laws, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 
325, 329–30 (2012). 
4 This definition is one of the most general. E.g., id. at 330; Joseph S. Nye, Corruption and 
Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 419 (1967). 
5  W. PAATII OFOSU-AMAAH, RAJ SOOPRAMANIEN & KISHOR UPRETY, COMBATING 
CORRUPTION: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF SELECTED LEGAL ASPECTS OF STATE PRACTICE AND 
MAJOR INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES 66 (1999), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1999/10/07/000094946_9909211
0080687/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf. See also Antonio Argandoña, Private-to-Private 
Corruption, 47 J. BUS. ETHICS 253 (2003).  
6  Note, Bribery in Commercial Relationships, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1250 (1932). 
7 See, e.g., Blake E. Ashforth et al., Re-Viewing Organizational Corruption, 33 ACAD. MGMT. 
REV. 670, 672–76 (2008) (discussing the harms of private sector corruption at firm, industry, 
national, and systems levels). 
8 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, BRIBE PAYERS INDEX REPORT 3, 19 (2011), available at 
http://bpi.transparency.org/bpi2011/results. Private sector corruption can be manifested by offering 
clients gifts and corporate hospitality, demanding bribes or kickbacks from potential suppliers, as 
well as paying bribes to secure beneficial contracts. Id. In fact, corruption in the private sector 
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Due to recent trends in the international marketplace, the potential 
harm of corruption has grown to the point that it can no longer be 
ignored. With the removal of many trade barriers between nations in 
recent years, companies face intense competition in emerging markets, 
which, in turn, has led to a proliferation of corrupt practices. 9 Other 
trends affecting corruption are the privatization of many publicly owned 
companies and the resulting blurring of the distinction between private 
corruption and the more effectively punished public sector corruption.10 
With ever-growing volumes of international trade, federal legislation 
prohibiting private sector corruption has become a necessity.  
This Comment will first examine current federal legislation and its 
shortcomings, then offer a blueprint for preventing some of the costs 
associated with private sector corruption by encouraging the United 
States to amend the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in two ways: 
1) adding a private right of action for victims of private sector corruption 
to recover damages, and 2) stepping up regulation of private corruption 
through heightened accounting and reporting requirements.  
Section II of this Comment examines existing regulations of private 
sector corruption in the U.S., including the FCPA,11 and discusses why 
they are currently inadequate. Section III discusses various international 
agreements on combating corruption and their implications for U.S. 
companies involved in international trade. Finally, Section IV of this 
Comment considers different options and explains why amending the 
FCPA to extend its accounting and reporting provisions to private sector 
corruption, together with providing victims of private sector corruption 
with a private right of action to recover damages, is the most sensible 
solution. 
 
II. U.S. ANTI-CORRUPTION STATUTES AND REGULATIONS:  
THE NEED FOR REFORM 
 
This Section will discuss existing anti-corruption regulations, both 
state and federal. First, this Section explores the FCPA and its criticisms, 
and it argues that these same criticisms should be considered in 
addressing private sector corruption. Next, this Section explores the 
inability of existing state and federal commercial bribery statutes to 
effectively address the problem of corruption in the private sector of 
international trade. Even the FCPA—the only statute that undoubtedly 
has extra-territorial reach—does not currently cover corruption in the 
private sector.                                                                                                                             
became more “visible” with the growth of international efforts to fight public sector corruption. See 
Argandoña, supra note 5. 
9 Argandoña, supra note 5, at 253–54. 
10 Id. at 254. See also OFOSU-AMAAH, SOOPRAMANIEN & UPRETY, supra note 5, at 66. 
11 The FCPA plays an important role in the analysis because it is thus far the only U.S. anti-
bribery statute that has transnational reach, and the lessons learned from an examination of public 
sector bribery regulations can potentially be translated into the private sector. See Nichols, supra 
note 3, at 331. 
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A. The FCPA: Lessons Learned and Future Challenges 
 
This subsection discusses the inception of the FCPA, its two major 
provisions and how they have been supplied, and its three major 
criticisms and relevant responses.  
 
1. History of Enactment 
 
 The FCPA is the child of a number of high-profile corruption 
scandals, including the Watergate scandal12 and the notorious Lockheed 
case, where a company bribed foreign public officials in the Netherlands, 
Japan, and Italy to obtain government contracts. 13 In 1975, Congress 
faced a grim picture: about 400 companies, including 117 in the Fortune 
Top-500, disclosed illegal or questionable payments to foreign officials 
after the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) instituted a 
voluntary disclosure program. 14  Many of these cases had entirely 
domestic effects since companies had paid bribes to “outcompete” their 
American peers rather than their foreign competitors.15 Still, Congress 
responded by proclaiming that bribing foreign public officials is “counter 
to the moral expectations and values of the American public.” 16  In 
addition to these economic dilemmas,17 corporate bribery caused foreign 
policy problems for the United States, jeopardizing its positions in the 
Cold War with the Soviet Union.18 After lengthy congressional debates 
on how to tackle corruption, President Carter signed the FCPA into law 
in December 1977.19 
The FCPA was amended twice, in 1988 and 1998. 20  The 1988 
amendment was mostly in response to complaints from businesses that 
the FCPA was too vague.21 The amendment established a standard of                                                         
12 Courtney C. Thomas, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of Rapid Expansion 
Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439, 442–43 (2010). Thomas points out that the 
Nixon Administration engaged in illegal activities, including the creation of secret “slush funds” 
used to fund illegal political campaign contributions and international bribery. Id. (quoting Lowell 
Brown, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1988 Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 26 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 239, 241 (2001)). 
13 Bruce W. Klaw, A New Strategy for Preventing Bribery and Extortion in International 
Business Transactions, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 303, 307 (2012). 
14 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (2006). 
15 Id. at 5. 
16 Id. at 4 (quotations omitted). 
17 Id. at 5. Members of Congress noted that bribery eroded public confidence in the free market 
by placing contracts in the hands of inefficient companies that cannot compete without bribing. Id. at 
4–5. It also led to costly lawsuits, cancellation of contracts, and other negative economic 
consequences. Id. 
18 Id. at 5. The Report states that corporate bribery “embarrass[es] friendly governments” and 
“lower[s] the esteem for the United States among the citizens of foreign nations.” Id. 
19 See Klaw, supra note 13, at 308; Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 83, 87 (2007). 
20 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 
1419-1425 (1988); International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
366, 112 Stat. 3302, 3302-3312 (1998). 
21 See Krever, supra note 19, at 88–89. 
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“knowing” for conduct by third parties22 and clarified the exception for 
“facilitating” or “grease-the-wheels” payments.23 The 1988 amendment 
also introduced some affirmative defenses to corruption charges.24 This 
latter amendment extended the reach of the FCPA to “any person” over 
which the U.S. Department of Justice had jurisdiction,25 as well as to any 
violations of the law “while in the territory of the United States,”26 thus 
making the law truly extra-territorial in nature.27 
 
2. A Brief Overview of the FCPA  
The FCPA has two major types of provisions: accounting28 and anti-
bribery.29 Under its accounting provisions, all publicly-held companies 
either registered or required to file reports with the SEC, including 
companies that hold American Depository Receipts,30 are subject to the 
FCPA’s record-keeping and internal control provisions. The FCPA 
requires every issuer of securities to31 “make and keep books, records, 
and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the 
transactions and dispositions of the assets.”32 Seemingly innocuous, this 
provision applies to a broad class of securities issuers, including those 
not having any foreign operations.33   
                                                        
22 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (2006) (defining “knowing” as a person's state of mind 
when a person is aware or has a strong belief as to the circumstances or that a result is certain to 
occur. Knowledge is also inferred when a person is aware of a high probability, unless a person 
actually believes that the circumstance does not exist); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(A) (2006) (defining 
the same); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(f)(3) (2006) (defining the same); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(3) (Supp. 
V 1981).  
23 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(B) (2006); 15 U.S.C § 78dd-2(B) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(B) (2006) 
(all three sections defining the same for different groups of affected entities); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-
1(B) (Supp. V 1981).  
24 See Krever, supra note 19, at 89. Payments are exempt if they are legal under the laws of the 
receiving official's country or if the payment is for “a reasonable and bona fide expenditure.” Id. 
25 See International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, § 4, 
112 Stat. 3302, 3306 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (2006)). 
26 Id. §§ 2(d), 3(d) (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(g), 78dd-2(i) (2006)). See Thomas, supra 
note 12, at 448 (suggesting that even foreign nationals are potentially subject to prosecution). 
27 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-802, at 54–55 (1998) (explaining that the 1998 amendments were 
meant to extend the reach of the FCPA to the acts taken on behalf of U.S. businesses “by their 
officers, directors, employees, agents or stockholders outside the territory of the United States, 
regardless of the nationality of the officer, director employee, agent, or stockholder”). 
28 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 103, 14 Stat. 1494 (1977) 
(codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2006)). 
29 Id.; Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 102, 14 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-
2, 78dd-3 (2006)). 
30 Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act – 1977 to 2010, 
12 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 89, 96 (2010). The FCPA also covers American Depository Receipts 
holders. David E. Dworsky, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 671, 675 (2009). 
Depository Receipts are instruments issued by U.S. banks representing a specified amount of shares 
of a foreign company that is traded on a U.S. exchange. Id. Thus, the FCPA potentially covers all the 
foreign companies traded on any U.S.-based exchanges. Id. 
31 See 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (2006). 
32 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2006). 
33 ROBERT W. TARUN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE FOR MULTINATIONAL GENERAL COUNSEL, TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERS AND WHITE-COLLAR 
CRIMINAL PRACTITIONERS 19 (2010). 
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The FCPA uses a broad definition of “records” that includes 
practically all “transcribed information of any type.” 34  “Reasonable 
detail” is defined as satisfying “prudent officials in the conduct of their 
own affairs.”35 Thus, FCPA record-keeping provisions are broad in scope 
and imply that even inaccurate records of non-material payments may be 
criminally punishable.36 The FCPA also requires companies to establish 
a system of controls to reasonably assure that transactions are properly 
authorized.37 
Two acts have been introduced to increase the effectiveness of the 
FCPA. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 introduces some notable 
changes to the accounting provisions of the FCPA.38 This Act increases 
penalties for violations of the FCPA’s reporting requirements. 39 
Additionally, it requires securities issuers to report results of internal 
control effectiveness assessments and to report any corrective measures 
needed to remedy deficiencies and material weaknesses.40 
The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 establishes a new whistleblower 
program to encourage reporting of any Securities Exchange Act 
violations, including the FCPA. 41 Under this program, whistleblowers 
that provide “original information” about FCPA violations are protected 
from retaliation and may even receive a monetary reward from the 
amounts recovered by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and SEC in 
enforcement actions. 42  Under another Dodd-Frank provision, the 
“resource extraction issuers” are required to report any payments made to 
foreign governments for the purpose of the commercial development of 
oil, natural gas, or minerals.43  
In addition to these accounting provisions, the FCPA has several 
anti-bribery provisions. These provisions constitute the “heart” of the 
statute. The anti-bribery provisions are broader in reach than the 
accounting provisions: they cover not only “issuers” of securities, but 
also “domestic concerns” and “any person . . . while in the territory of 
the United States.” 44  These provisions criminalize bribery of foreign                                                         
34 Id. 
35 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7) (2006). 
36 See Bixby, supra note 30, at 96; Dworsky, supra note 30, at 675. 
37 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(i). See also Dworsky, supra note 30, at 677 (listing factors the 
SEC considers in determining the adequacy of the internal controls system: (i) the role of the board 
of directors; (ii) communication of corporate procedures and policies; (iii) assignment of authority 
and responsibility; (iv) competence and integrity of personnel; (v) accountability for performance 
and compliance with policies and procedures; and (vi) objectivity and effectiveness of the internal 
audit function). 
38 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 
and 29 U.S.C. (2006)). 
39 Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1106, 116 Stat. 745, 810 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) 
(2006)). 
40 Id.; § 302(a)(6), 116 Stat. at 777 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(6) (2006)). 
41 Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 922-924, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841-50 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
78u-6, 78u-7 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). 
42 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-3 (2014). 
43 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(1)(D)-(2)(A) (2012). 
44  15 U.S.C. §§78dd-1(a) (“issuers”), 78dd-2(a) (“domestic concerns”), 78dd-3(a) (“any 
person”) (1998).  See also  Peter W. Schroth, The United States and the Int'l Bribery Conventions, 
50 AM. J. COMP. L. 593, 602-04 (2002) (discussing that actions under this section have in some 
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officials in order to “influence any act,” induce any unlawful action, or 
induce any action that would “assist . . . in obtaining or retaining 
business” or “securing any improper advantage.” 45  Individuals or 
businesses are prohibited from “directly or indirectly offering, paying, 
promising, or authorizing to pay money or anything of any value to any 
foreign official.”46 
 Originally, prosecuting violations of these anti-bribery provisions 
was difficult for two reasons. The first difficulty was, and continues to 
be, the requirement of proving certain elements, including the intent to 
corruptly influence any official act or decision.47 The second difficulty to 
successful prosecution was the requirement of a territorial nexus between 
the corrupt act and the United States. 48  Fortunately, the FCPA was 
amended in 1998 to exclude the territorial nexus requirement, making the 
use of interstate commerce no longer necessary for prosecution of 
securities issuers and domestic concerns under the FCPA.49 
It is also important to note that the FCPA does not prohibit 
“facilitating” or “grease” payments to foreign public officials for the 
performance of routine governmental actions. 50  Of further note, the 
FCPA outlines two affirmative defenses.51 First, if offering a payment, 
gift, or “anything of value” to a foreign official is within the written laws 
of the host country, such payments do not fall within the scope of the 
FCPA. 52  The second defense covers “reasonable and bona fide 
expenditure[s]” made without a corrupt purpose.53 
 
3. Ongoing Criticisms of the FCPA  
The FCPA has been the target of criticism since its enactment in 
1977. Three major criticisms are that the FCPA 1) leads to a competitive                                                                                                                             
instances reached foreign persons who were neither doing business in the U.S. nor were residents of 
the U.S.). 
45 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)-3(a)(1998). 
46 Dworsky, supra note 30, at 678. 
47 Id. at 680–82 (providing the full list of elements). See also Bixby, supra note 30, at 94. 
48 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(g) (providing alternative bases for jurisdiction over issuers); § 78dd-
2(i) (providing alternative bases for jurisdiction over domestic concerns). 
49 Dworsky, supra note 30, at 673. 
50 Id. However, in Wabtec, the DOJ asserted that periodic payments to railroad officials to 
speed up shipments ranging from $67 to $358 and totaling $2,175 per year violated the FCPA. Non-
Prosecution Letter re Wabtec from Criminal Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, at 4 (Feb. 8, 2008), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/westinghouse-corp/02-08-08wabtec-
agree.pdf. 
51 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c), 78dd-2(c), 78dd-3(c) (1998); see also H.R. REP. No. 100-579, at 
921-22 (1988) (Conf. Rep.) (discussing affirmative defenses included in the 1988 amendments to the 
FPCA). 
52 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(1), 78dd-2(c)(1), 78dd-3(c)(1).  The statute itself does not set a cap 
on the maximum allowable amount. See, e.g., Bixby, supra note 30, at 96. Bruce Klaw suggests 
setting it at the level of five thousand dollars per official because most payments below this 
threshold would fall under existing FCPA exceptions or defenses and would be too inconsequential 
to satisfy the “obtaining or retaining business” element of the FCPA. See Klaw, supra note 13, at 
351–52. However, in Wabtec, the company was prosecuted for payments as small as $67. See supra 
note 50. 
53 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), 78dd-2(c)(2), 78dd-3(c)(2). See also Dworsky, supra note 30, at 
684 (explaining when the defense is available).  
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disadvantage for American corporations, 2) presents an example of moral 
imperialism, and 3) is blind to the “demand” side of corruption. Because 
the same reasoning may be used to criticize attempts to regulate private 
sector corruption, addressing each of these criticisms is important in 
designing a response to the problem of private sector corruption. 
First, scholars and business leaders criticize the FCPA as being a 
competitive disadvantage for U.S. corporations. For example, studies 
conducted in the U.S in the 1980–90s show that the market share of U.S. 
companies increased significantly in regions where bribery was 
common,54 as well as in some industries that were deemed susceptible to 
bribery.55 Additionally, defending against FCPA lawsuits has become a 
major legal expense item for corporations,56 leaving these corporations 
with decreased resources. Further, some economic analysts claim that the 
FCPA and its enforcement result in companies forgoing economic 
opportunities out of the fear of prosecution.57  
On the other hand, there is evidence that the FCPA’s anti-bribery 
provisions may indeed be an advantage to some U.S. companies.58 First, 
scholars argue that the ability to give bribes can hardly be described as a 
“competitive advantage” since such payments result in inefficiency both 
on the macro 59 and micro economic levels; 60  thus, the FCPA guards 
against these economic inefficiencies. Second, companies that give 
bribes also show slower growth rates and lower productivity, experience 
higher direct costs, and are more likely to have strained internal and 
external relationships.61 Third, some U.S. companies report the FCPA’s 
                                                        
54 See Krever, supra note 19, at 90–91.   
55 Id. (noting that in those industries more susceptible to corruption the growth rates were even 
higher than in other industries). 
56 See Joe Palazzolo, FCPA Inc.: The Business of Bribery, WALL STREET JOURNAL BLOG (Oct. 
2, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443862604578028462294611352.html 
(reporting that Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Avon Products, Inc., and Weatherford International Inc. spent 
$456 million on internal investigation of corruption before even being charged, and that most of the 
money went to law firms and other specialists hired to conduct investigations and improve internal 
control systems). 
57  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AFMD-91-34, IMPACT OF FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT ON U.S. BUSINESS, 14 (1981), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/140/132199.pdf.  See also U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL 
REFORM, RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES 
ACT 6 (2010), available at http://ilr.iwssites.com/uploads/sites/1/restoringbalance_fcpa.pdf (stating 
that “up to $1 billion” in “lost U.S. export trade” results from the FCPA every year).  
58 See Nichols, supra note 3 (citing research on the effects of corruption and highlighting its 
devastating effects at the company level). But see Krever, supra note 19, at 90–92 (citing studies 
showing that the FCPA did not have such a detrimental economic effect on businesses).  
59  See generally SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, 
CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM 25–26 (1999). Rose-Ackerman was one of the first scholars who 
discussed detrimental effects of corruption on the overall government legitimacy and how it deters 
direct foreign investment. See also Elizabeth Spahn, Nobody Gets Hurt?, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 861, 
869–70 (2010) (arguing that bribery destroys “rational markets” because contracts go into the hands 
of those willing to pay bribes, without regard to such traditional rational market factors as price and 
quality). 
60 See Nichols, supra note 3, at 328. 
61 Id. at 335 (direct costs), 338 (lower growth rates), 340 (lower productivity), 341 (internal 
relationships), 344 (external relationships). 
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prohibitions on giving bribes as helping them avoid unnecessary 
expenses.62  
Moreover, U.S. companies that do not engage in corruption may not 
be at a disadvantage to companies that do; economic analysts claim that 
FCPA enforcement reaches beyond U.S. borders and results in 
“economic sanctions” in the form of “a reduction in investments” for 
corporations in developing countries with widespread corruption. 63 
Additionally, the 1977 House Report notes that paying bribes could be 
unnecessary, as many U.S. companies have successful export programs 
without engaging in corruption.64 
The second criticism of the FCPA is that it constitutes moral 
imperialism. Scholars emphasize that the definition of corruption can be 
dependent on “cultural and linguistic gaps”: what some cultures consider 
hospitality, others outlaw as corruption. 65  Imposing an American 
definition of corruption on other nations is, in some cases, incompatible 
with their practices.66 Moreover, such cultural imposition might cause 
parties to forgo economically efficient transactions because they violate 
U.S. moral standards (as incorporated in the FCPA).67   
In response, other scholars argue that the FCPA demonstrates a 
certain degree of cultural sensitivity by facilitating payment provisions 
and allowing affirmative defenses to allegations of corruption.68 Indeed, 
the 1977 House Report explains that while some payments “may be 
reprehensible in the United States, the committee recognizes that they are 
not necessarily so viewed elsewhere in the world and that it is not 
feasible for the United States to attempt unilaterally to eradicate all such 
payments.”69 
The third and final criticism of the FCPA is that it focuses on the 
supply side of corruption, leaving foreign public officials who take or 
solicit bribes out of its reach. 70  In other words, the FCPA fails to 
accomplish the global trend of attempting to punish both supply and 
demand sides of corruption.71 Scholars argue that it would be reasonable 
for American legislators to consider enacting similar provisions both to 
                                                        
62 Christopher L. Hall, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Competitive Disadvantage, But 
For How Long?, 2 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 289, 309 (1994) (referencing how the FCPA helped 
Colgate-Palmolive to avoid questionable payments while negotiating a joint venture in China). 
63 Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation as 
Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351, 366 (2010).  
64 H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 5 (1977). 
65 Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Harmony, 20 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 419, 429 (1999). 
66 Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 276–78 (1997). 
67 Marie M. Dalton, Efficiency v. Morality: The Codification of Cultural Norms in the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, 2 N.Y.U.J.L. & BUS. 583, 608 (2006). 
68 Spalding, supra note 63, at 365. 
69 H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977). 
70 See generally Spalding, supra note 63, at 358–64. 
71 See Part III of this Comment. 
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address problems within the U.S. and to contribute to global efforts to 
eradicate corruption on both sides72 
 
B. Regulation of Private Sector Corruption in the United States  
The United States has long considered punishing private sector 
corruption.73 Domestically, there are many legal theories one can use to 
sue a company that obtains business by means of bribery. However, 
while many states have extensive commercial bribery regulations, many 
of these statutes lack the extra-territorial reach of the FCPA and do not 
cover foreign corruption. This causes state laws to be inadequate in that 
they condemn commercial bribery domestically, but do nothing about 
bribery in the context of international trade. 74  This subsection first 
explores state remedies for private sector corruption and then covers the 
following federal statutory remedies: the Robinson-Patman Act, the Wire 
and Mail Fraud Statute, and the Travel Act.75 
 
1. State Remedies and Challenges Regarding Private Sector Corruption  
Many states offer a variety of legal avenues to pursue claims of 
private sector corruption, such as unfair competition laws, tortious 
interference with prospective business relations laws, and—most 
importantly—criminal laws prohibiting commercial bribery.76 Yet, even 
at the beginning of the Twentieth Century, scholars and legislators 
realized that state-to-state differences in such regulations posed a great 
problem in prosecuting commercial bribery across state lines. 77  If 
prosecuting across state lines proves to be a challenge, it is easy to see 
the difficulty in prosecuting corruption based in another country.                                                          
72 See Klaw, supra note 13, at 320–24, 334–36, 361–68.  Klaw argues that punishing only bribe 
payers is inequitable because, under the current provisions, corrupt public officials who solicit or 
accept illegal payments go free. He claims that neither jurisdictional basis nor immunity of said 
officials would pose an obstacle to prosecution if the host country were unwilling or unable to 
prosecute. 
73 Bribery, supra note 6, at 1248–51 (1932). The appearance of an editorial on the subject of 
commercial bribery in Harvard Law Review indicates the scholarly and societal debate of the issue. 
74 A recent Supreme Court decision in Kiobel raises additional concerns by introducing the 
“touch and concern test” to displace a general presumption against extra-territoriality of U.S. laws. 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). Essentially, the majority opinion 
precludes any litigation against U.S. corporations committing torts abroad in the U.S. courts because 
it focuses on where the conduct has occurred, not citizenship of a corporate defendant. See Kedar S. 
Bhatia, Comment, Reconsidering the Purely Jurisdictional View of the Alien Tort Statute, 27 EMORY 
INT’L L. REV. 447, 474–77 (2013). Because commercial bribery is likely classified as a tort or a 
crime in other foreign jurisdictions, U.S. corporations are likely protected from any tort claims if the 
bribing occurred outside the U.S. under Kiobel’s arduous “touch and concern” test. In countries that 
do not recognize commercial bribery as a tort or a crime, plaintiffs will be without any legal means 
to recover the damages suffered. Thus, only the adoption of an FCPA-like statute, where Congress 
states clearly that it is extra-territorial in nature, would be a solution for the problem of private sector 
corruption in international trade. 
75 Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. §13a, 13b, 21a (1936); Mail and Wire 
Fraud Statute, 18 U.S.C. §1341 (2008); Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. §1952 (2012). 
76 See, e.g., COMMERCIAL BRIBERY & CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY (2012), (LexisNexis 
2012). 
77 See Note, supra note 6 at 1249–50. 
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Despite these challenges, many states have adopted criminal 
provisions prohibiting commercial bribery. 78  These state regulations 
vary, however. Some states punish commercial bribery as a felony, 
others as a misdemeanor. 79  Some states define commercial bribery 
broadly; others define it as applying only to certain activities.80 Further, 
the elements of the offense vary a great deal from state to state, including 
varying “degrees of culpability, levels of intent, relationships among the 
parties, and showings of harm, among others.”81 
In addition to the challenge presented by the lack of uniformity 
among state anti-corruption statues, several major problems arise when 
applying state criminal laws to international trade. First, many statutes 
apply only to acts of bribery committed within the state’s territory or by 
the state’s residents.82 This makes it impossible to apply those laws to 
commercial bribery abroad, even when it is a U.S. company that has 
committed the bribery.83 Second, state statutes do not establish a private 
right of action, 84  leaving victims of bribery (both consumers and 
competitors) without any redress for the harm suffered. Finally, because 
of the difficulty of proving commercial bribery, local prosecutors rarely 
enforce such laws.85 
Another problem with punishing international corruption under state 
anti-corruption statues is that some states punish corruption under tort 
schemes with ineffective deterrents (e.g. unfair competition and tortious 
interference with business relationships). As Judge Richard Posner said, 
“[B]ribery is a deliberate tort, and one way to deter it is to make it 
worthless to the tortfeasor by stripping away all his gain.”86 Such tort 
cases can be difficult to pursue because courts are reluctant to let such 
cases stand.87                                                          
78 COMMERCIAL BRIBERY, 2 LAWS OF PURCHASING CHAPTER 33:1 INTRODUCTION (2014).  
79 Ryan J. Rohlfsen, Recent Developments in Foreign and Domestic Commercial Bribery laws, 
2012 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 151, 163 (2012). 
80 Id.  
81 Id. 
82 COMMERCIAL BRIBERY & CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY (2012), (LexisNexis 2012). 
83 For example, in U.S. v. Welch, a famous case about Salt Lake City officials bribing the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC), the district court held that the Utah commercial bribery 
statute did not apply to the members of the IOC and dismissed the charges. 248 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (D. 
Utah 2001). The case was reversed and remanded by U.S. v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081 (10th Cir. 2003). 
Yet, Welch was not prosecuted for giving over $1 million in gifts and payouts to the members of the 
IOC. Additionally, at least some episodes of bribing happened in Utah or within the U.S., which 
made the reversal and application of U.S. laws possible. It is an open question, however, whether 
state laws, even with the help of the Travel Act, can be applied to events that occurred completely 
outside the United States, like when an American corporation’s agent gives a bribe to secure a 
contract in another country.   
84 Editorial Staff, COMMERCIAL BRIBERY, 2 LAWS OF PURCHASING, Ch. 33 § 1, at Introduction 
(2014). 
85 Id. This position is understandable: in the world of limited resources, public agencies will 
always have to choose what law enforcement priorities to pursue.  The potential effects of 
commercial bribery pale in comparison to the devastating effects of murder, human and drug 
trafficking, and other “traditional” crimes. Additionally, criminal law imposes a very high standard 
of proof—beyond a reasonable doubt—on the prosecution. 
86 Williams Elec. Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 366 F.3d 569, 576 (7th Cir. 2004). 
87 For example, in New York, the burden of proof in such cases rests on the victim, and the 
amount of damages is generally limited to the bribe amount. See John P. Woods, Civil Forfeiture as 
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This reluctance seems reasonable for several reasons. First, the line 
between bona fide promotional business expenditures and bribes lacks 
clarity. Additionally, there is always the risk of discouraging legal 
business practices and encouraging competitors’ rent-seeking behavior 
by setting easy-to-establish prima facie case elements. However, the 
amount of the bribe (and sometimes the revenue the bribe generates) 
usually limits the award of damages in commercial bribery cases. 88 
Ultimately, though, state tort corruption actions and criminal corruption 
laws will likely fail in foreign commercial bribery cases because the 
Constitution prohibits the states from dealing with international trade 
issues.89  
 
2. Federal Statutes Relating to Commercial Bribery  
One recent study that explores the attitudes of Americans towards 
bribery shows that Americans disapprove of commercial bribery almost 
as much as they do government bribery, especially among corporate 
executive and high-ranking public officials.90 Such attitudes are not new; 
in 1922, concern of widespread commercial bribery prompted the House 
of Representatives to declare a need for additional deterrence in the form 
of uniform federal legislation.91 Although the 1992 House introduced and 
even passed such legislation, the Senate did not agree, so it never became 
law.92  
Still, several federal statutes currently allow for the prosecution of 
bribery. The Robinson-Patman Act regulates discriminatory pricing and 
so-called “dummy commissions.”93 The Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes 
and the doctrine of “honest services” give companies a right of action 
against employees who act contrary to the interests of the company by 
accepting or giving bribes. 94 And the Travel Act makes it a criminal                                                                                                                             
a Remedy for Corruption in Public and Private Contracting in New York, 75 ALB. L. REV. 931, 961 
(2011). Woods argues that this encourages private sector corruption and that imposing forfeiture and 
reimbursement remedy in this context would change the situation significantly. Id. 
88 See Williams Elec. Games, Inc., 366 F.3d at 576 (“The victim of commercial bribery, who 
usually as here is the principal of an agent who was bribed, can obtain by way of remedy either the 
damages that he has sustained (the damages remedy) or the profits that the bribe yielded (the 
restitution or unjust enrichment remedy). The total profits would consist of the bribe itself (received 
by Barry, of course, not by Garrity or Arrow), plus the revenue that the bribe generated for the 
briber, minus the cost of goods sold and any other variable costs incurred in making the sales that 
generated that revenue.” (citation omitted)).  
89 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
90  See Stuart P. Green & Mathew B. Kugler, Public Perceptions of White Collar Crime 
Culpability: Bribery, Perjury, and Fraud, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 47, table 2 (2012). 
Authors assert that though corrupt government officials are still perceived as more blameworthy and 
deserving higher punishment, almost eighty percent of respondents think that corrupt conduct of 
corporate board members should be treated as a crime. Id. at 46. Authors claimed that this finding 
was “striking” given that federal laws do not regulate commercial bribery, at least not within the 
FCPA. Id.  
91 Bribery, supra note 6, at 1250. 
92 Id. 
93 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2014) [hereinafter “Robinson-Patman Act”]. 
94 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2014). 
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offense to violate state commercial bribery regulations while traveling 
between states.95  
Congress enacted the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936.96 The thrust of 
the statute prohibits sellers from charging disparate prices for different 
customers. This Act also prohibits sellers from making payments to a 
purchaser’s agents or brokers with the purpose of inducing the purchaser 
to enter into a transaction.97 Many courts recognize this Act as applying 
to commercial bribery.98 In these jurisdictions, the illegal payment itself 
qualifies as a violation.99 
Notably, the Robinson-Patman Act can also be applied to 
commercial bribery involving foreign transactions. 100  However, the 
language of the statute is not focused on international bribery, and courts 
have narrowly interpreted the language of the statute by limiting the 
meaning of “within the flow” of commerce among the several states or 
with foreign nations under 15 U.S.C. § 13(c).101 Courts have yet to rule 
that the Robinson-Patman Act applies to private sector commercial 
bribery in foreign trade.102                                                          
95 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2014). 
96 15 U.S.C. § 13. 
97 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) reads, in the relevant part: “It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in 
commerce, in the course of such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of 
value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu 
thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or 
merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction or to an agent, representative, or other 
intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the 
direct or indirect control, of any party to such transaction other than the person by whom such 
compensation is so granted or paid.” 
98 See, e.g., FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 169–70 n.6 (1960) (mentioning that the 
Act might apply to commercial bribery); Bridges v. MacLean-Stevens Studios, Inc., 201 F.3d 6 (1st 
Cir. 2000) (discussing, without deciding, that commercial bribery is actionable under § 2(c)). 
99 Editorial Staff, COMMERCIAL BRIBERY, 2 LAWS OF PURCHASING, Ch. 33 § 1, at Introduction 
(2014). 
100 In 1978, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued identical consent orders against the 
Lockheed Corporation and the Boeing Company for making payments to foreign government 
officials in connection with the sales of aircrafts. See In re Lockheed Corp., 92 F.T.C. 968 (1978); In 
re Boeing Co., 92 F.T.C. 972 (1978).  The FTC concluded that such payments had an effect on other 
domestic competitors by depriving them of sales opportunities with bribed governments and 
officials.  
101 In Rotec Industries v. Mitsubishi Corp., the court found that payments made by a Japanese 
company to a Chinese company to secure a contract for equipment in China were outside of the 
Robinson-Patman Act’s reach, even though a U.S. company suffered damages as a result. Rotec 
Industries v. Mitsubishi Corp., 348 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2003). 
102 Although not on an issue of commercial bribery, a recent decision of the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act bars litigation in the U.S. 
of antitrust claims “‘unless such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect 
on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or 
import commerce with foreign nations,’ and also, in either case, unless the ‘effect gives rise to a 
claim’ under federal antitrust law.” Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 746 F.3d 842, 
844 (7th Cir. 2014), vacated by 12704 U.S. App LEXIS, July 1, 2014. (citing F. Hoffman-La Roche 
Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 161–62 (2004); Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 
845, 853–54 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc)), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 23 (2013), opinion and judgment 
vacated by the order on July 1, 2014, rehearing granted. Judge Posner, who wrote the opinion, 
concluded that unless price fixing of foreign suppliers to Motorola foreign subsidiaries had a 
“‘direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect’ on commerce within the United States,” and 
alleged violations occurred not on U.S. soil, an antitrust claim brought in a U.S. court should be 
dismissed because of the policy against extra-territorial application of U.S. laws. See id. 
“[R]ampant extra-territorial application of U.S. law ‘creates a serious risk of interference with a 
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In addition to the Robinson-Patman Act, the Mail and Wire Fraud 
Statutes103 play an important role in fighting domestic corruption, both 
private and public. These Statutes prohibit the use of the mail or 
interstate wires to execute any “scheme or artifice to defraud, or for 
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises.” 104  Historically, these Statutes helped to 
hold individuals accountable both for monetary losses and for the losses 
based on the “honest services” doctrine.105 However, the statute did not 
apply to international corruption, and became even less effective with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in McNally v. United States when the Court 
held that the Wire Fraud Statute applies only to the protection of property 
rights, and “does not extend to the intangible right of the citizenry to 
good government.” 106 Although this case concerned public sector 
corruption, it affected the prosecution of cases involving commercial 
bribery as well.107  
After McNally, Congress reacted swiftly by promulgating Section 
1346, which provided the new statutory basis for the “intangible right to 
honest services” fraud. 108  Yet again, in 2010, the Supreme Court in 
Skilling v. United States limited the interpretation of the Statutes only to 
schemes involving bribery and kickbacks, 109 leaving undisclosed self-
dealing by public officials and private employees completely out of the 
Statutes’ reach.110 For now, the fate of the Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes’ 
effort to create a right to honest services, with the implied right of action 
                                                                                                                            
foreign nation’s ability independently to regulate its own commercial affairs.’” Id. at 8 (citing F. 
Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 542 U.S. at 161–62). Allowing the Sherman Act to have extra-territorial 
reach would create “friction with many foreign countries and ‘resent[ment at] the apparent effort of 
the United States to act as the world’s competition police officer,’ a primary concern motivating the 
foreign trade act.” Id. at 8 (citing United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Co., 322 F.3d 942, 
960–62 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (dissenting opinion), overruled on other grounds by Minn-Chem, 
Inc. 683 F.3d 845, 853–54). Extending this logic to the Robinson-Patman Act would lead to a 
similar—and paradoxical—conclusion in the context of private sector corruption in foreign trade: it 
is akin to allowing one’s child to destroy a neighbor’s yard and not punishing him or her for it 
because of some illusory considerations of comity and potential frictions justified by lack of effect on 
one’s own yard.  
103 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346 (2012). 
104 18 U.S.C. § 1341. 
105 J.B. Perrine & Patricia M. Kipnis, Navigating the Honest Services Fraud Statute After 
Skilling v. United States, 72 ALA. L. REV. 294, 295–96 (2011). 
106 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987). 
107 For example, in United States v. Covino, the Second Circuit ruled that an employee who 
directed business opportunities to a contractor in exchange for money and property did not breach 
the duty of loyalty to his company because there was no evidence that his employer overpaid for the 
contractor’s services or suffered any property loss beyond the intangible, non-property interest in the 
honest and faithful services of an employee. United States v. Covino, 837 F.2d 65, 70 (1988). 
108 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012). 
109 Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010). Jeffrey Skilling was the Enron CEO who 
was charged with self-dealing under the Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes and the related doctrine of 
“honest services.” The majority of the Supreme Court justices rejected the arguments that the law 
covers prosecuting for “self-dealing”—that is, taking some action that gives one personal gain, 
without disclosing that fact. The Justices reasoned that expanding the interpretation of the statute to 
cover anything more than bribes and kickbacks would be unconstitutional because the plain 
language of the statute does not give people clear understanding of what is forbidden.   
110 Hon. Pamela Mathy, Honest Services After Skilling, 42 ST. MARY’S L.J. 645, 701 (2011). 
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when that right is violated, remains unclear.111 The Statutes might yet be 
effectively used in bribery and kickback foreign trade cases, but they no 
longer cover other forms of private sector corruption and they do not 
give employers and citizens the right to sue for breach of loyalty and 
fiduciary duties.  
Finally, the Travel Act applies to any person participating “in 
interstate or foreign commerce,” or who uses “mail or any facility in 
interstate or foreign commerce” with the intent to commit enumerated 
criminal acts, including the violation of state or U.S. bribery laws.112  
Initially, some disagreement existed over whether the generic term 
“bribery” applied to commercial bribery, however the Supreme Court 
settled the dispute in Perrin v. United States.113 In Perrin, the Court held 
that violating state commercial bribery statutes could indicate a Travel 
Act violation.114 Since Perrin, however, only a few reported cases have 
applied the Travel Act to commercial bribery.115   
Though the Travel Act applies to international trade, 116 it can be 
difficult to prove that commercial transactions happening outside a U.S. 
territory violate any U.S. federal or state laws. The Travel Act does not 
state that the predicate violation can be based on a law of a foreign 
country, 117 and no other federal law directly criminalizes commercial 
bribery. As with state commercial bribery statutes, the Travel Act does 
not provide a private right of action to victims of private sector 
corruption. 118 This leaves enforcement susceptible to the pressures of 
international policy and resource scarcity, further limiting the Travel 
Act’s influence on international trade. 
 
C. The Need for Reform  
U.S. regulations of private sector corruption currently resemble a 
patchwork quilt. Many states have criminal laws prohibiting commercial 
bribery; however, such laws are inconsistent from state to state, and the 
scope of their application to international transactions is not clear. State 
tort law is equally variable. Current state approaches to damages likely 
discourage victims from starting expensive litigation.119 In the absence of 
a federal statute prohibiting commercial bribery, the efforts of private 
plaintiffs to recover under the doctrine of honest services or under the                                                         
111 See Perrine, supra note 105, at 297–98. 
112  Pub. L. No 87-228, 75 Stat. 498 (1961), codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (Travel Act). 
Specifically, § 1952(b)(2) states that bribery in violation of the laws of the State in which committed 
or of the United States is an “unlawful activity” within the meaning of the statute. 
113 Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (1979). 
114 Id. at 45. 
115 Rohlfsen, supra note 79, at 151. 
116 Welch, 327 F.3d at 1081. See supra note 83. 
117 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)(2) specifically covers “bribery . . . in violation of the State in which 
committed or of the United States.” It is doubtful that the word “State” in its ordinary sense 
encompassed foreign countries. The Supreme Court or any other federal courts have not addressed 
this issue yet. 
118 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2014). 
119 See supra notes 86-89 and related text. 
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Robinson-Patman Act could prove unsuccessful in international trade 
cases. The Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes’ effectiveness in deterring 
private sector corruption remains unclear and could remain quite limited. 
Further, though the Travel Act criminalizes bribery committed in 
violation of state laws, it does not give a private right of action and it 
requires significant governmental resources to put together a viable 
international trade case. Finally, although the FCPA has the requisite 
extra-territorial reach, it simply does not cover private sector corruption. 
Nevertheless, corruption consistently remains one of the top 
concerns of the DOJ and the Federal Bureau of Investigations “because 
of the extent and seriousness of their existence to a free democratic 
society.”120 Another DOJ goal remains to promote international efforts in 
fighting corruption. 121  Despite these concerns, U.S. national anti-
corruption legislation falls significantly behind that of other nations—
including China and Russia122—in terms of prohibiting private sector 
corruption, leading to questions as to whether the United States will 
retain its status as a global leader in the fight against corruption. 
The U.S. should take action now to consider what options provide it 
with the ability to regulate private corruption in international trade. The 
current legislative void needs to be filled either by amending the FCPA 
to cover private sector corruption abroad, or by enacting a separate 
federal statute.123 The FCPA just celebrated its thirty-fifth anniversary 
and, despite the criticism, has proven to be an efficient, if limited, 
instrument in deterring and prosecuting bribery of foreign public 
officials. The FCPA has helped change business culture: companies now 
almost universally adopt business conduct codes and provide trainings to 
employees on various ethics topics.124 Therefore, the best option is to 
amend the FCPA. 
 
III. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR CORRUPTION 
PROBLEM 
 
To give an overview of the global efforts in fighting private sector 
corruption, this Section will explore the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption (UNCAC); the Organization for Economic 
Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions and related 
instruments; The Council of Europe Civil and Criminal Conventions on                                                         
120 OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STEWARDS OF THE AMERICAN DREAM: 
STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2007–2012, at 6 (2007); see also OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2012–2016, at 11 (2012). 
121 Strategic Plan FY 2012-2016, supra note 120, at 11. 
122 See Part III.D. 
123 Which in fact means amending the Securities Exchange Act for accounting and reporting 
provisions and 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 for inclusion of private sector bribery as a punishable criminal 
offense. 
124 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPACT OF FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ON U.S. 
BUSINESS 17 (Mar. 4, 1981), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/140/132199.pdf. 
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Corruption; and some recent national legislative initiatives in countries 
such as the United Kingdom, China, and Russia.   
With many countries adopting private sector corruption regulations, 
U.S. companies abroad may find themselves under much stricter scrutiny 
in light of local laws. Thus, compliance with the FCPA fails to shield a 
corporation from undesirable investigations and lawsuits in foreign 
jurisdictions.   
 
A. The United Nations Convention Against Corruption  
The UNCAC provides a global and legally binding instrument for 
fighting corruption at the international level.125 The Convention aims at 
preventing and combating various forms of corruption through 
encouraging international cooperation and technical assistance; providing 
mechanisms of asset recovery; and promoting integrity, accountability, 
and proper management of public affairs and property.126 
Corruption has concerned the United Nations (UN) for several 
decades.127 The idea of creating an international legal instrument against 
corruption grew out of the preparatory work for the UN Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime.128 In December 2000, the UN 
General Assembly tasked the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime with negotiating the 
new anti-corruption convention. 129  In January 2002, the UN General 
Assembly decided that the Ad Hoc Committee should draft and negotiate 
a comprehensive anti-corruption convention.130 The General Assembly 
adopted the UNCAC on October 31, 2003, and opened it for signatures 
by Member States in December 2003.131 The convention then entered 
into force on December 14, 2005.132 As of October 19, 2012, UNCAC 
was signed by 140 countries, and listed 165 countries as “State 
                                                        
125 Antonio Argandoña, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption and its Impact on 
International Companies, 74 J. BUS. ETHICS 481, 481 (2007). [hereinafter, Argandoña 2007]. 
126 U.N. Convention against Corruption art. 1, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc. A/58/422, 3249 
U.N.T.S. 41 (entered into force Dec. 14, 2005) [hereinafter UNCAC]. 
127 U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR 
THE ELABORATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION (2010), available 
at 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Travaux/Travaux_Preparatoires_-
_UNCAC_E.pdf. Argandoña cites as examples: CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICIALS (1979), MANUAL OF PRACTICAL MEASURES AGAINST CORRUPTION (1990), BASIC 
PRINCIPLES ON THE ROLE OF LAWYERS (1990), INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PUBLIC 
OFFICIALS (1996), and DECLARATION ON CRIME AND PUBLIC SAFETY (1996). Argandoña 2007, 
supra note 125, at 493 n.4. 
128 Argandoña 2007, supra note 125, at 485. 
129 G.A. Res. 55/61, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/61 (Dec. 4, 2000). 
130 G.A. Res. 56/260, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/260 (Jan. 31, 2002). 
131 U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 127, xlii. 
132 Id. at xliii. 
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parties.” 133  The United States ratified the convention on October 30, 
2006.134 
The UNCAC does not give a clear definition of corruption. Instead, 
it focuses on identifying the most common forms of corruption, such as 
bribery, money laundering, embezzlement and misappropriation of 
property by public officials, trading in influence, abuse of positions, and 
others.135 The UNCAC, however, does provide room for the adopting 
countries to choose a set of measures they want to implement. 136 
Although some anti-corruption provisions are mandatory for adoption by 
the state-parties, other provisions—including provisions on private sector 
corruption—are only recommended measures.137 
Provisions on private sector corruption represent one of the 
UNCAC’s most significant and controversial innovations. 138  The 
UNCAC addresses both preventive measures, such as enhancing 
accounting and auditing standards, promoting transparency of the private 
sector, directly prohibiting certain practices, and potentially 
criminalizing bribery and embezzlement in the private sector. 139 
Interestingly, the United States (the country that has long led the global 
fight against public sector corruption) actively opposed regulation of 
purely private sector conduct. 140  As a result of the United States’ 
opposition, the final version of the UNCAC includes only non-
mandatory measures for private sector corruption criminalization.141 By 
2011, fewer than half of the State parties had criminalized bribery in the 
private sector, but many countries had adopted criminal provisions 
against embezzlement.142 
Another significant innovation of the UNCAC is the creation of a 
private right of action for the entities or persons who have suffered 
damage resulting from corrupt acts.143 The provision was adopted despite 
the protests of U.S. companies that feared increasing exposure to                                                         
133 U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIMES, UNCAC SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION STATUS AS 
OF SEPTEMBER 24, 2012, (Feb. 12, 2013, 10:50 AM), 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html. 
134 Id. 
135 UNCAC, supra note 126, art. 14 (money laundering), art.15 (bribery of domestic officials), 
art. 16 (bribery of foreign officials), art. 21 (private sector bribery), art. 14 (money laundering), art. 
17 (embezzlement), art. 18 (trading in influence), and art. 19 (abuse of functions). 
136 Argandoña 2007, supra note125, at 485–88. 
137 Id. at 488–89. 
138  U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, TECHNICAL GUIDE TO THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION 56 (2009), available at 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/TechnicalGuide/09-
84395_Ebook.pdf; see also Philippa Webb, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: 
Global Achievement or Missed Opportunity?, 8 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 191, 213 (2005). 
139 UNCAC, supra note 126, arts. 12, 21. 
140 Webb, supra note 138, at 213. Webb reports that the U.S. representative said that the 
country deals with this problem “in another way.” 
141 See id. at 214 (2005); Argandoña 2007, supra note 125, at 494 n.21. 
142 Conference of the State Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 
24–28, 2011, Report on Implementation of Chapter III (Criminalization and Law Enforcement) of 
the United Nations Convention against Corruption, ¶¶ 11–12, CAC/COSP/2011/2 (Aug. 25, 2011). 
143 UNCAC, supra note 126, art. 35. 
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lawsuits brought by foreign parties.144 Each State party, however, retains 
an unabridged right to determine under which circumstances its courts 
will be available for such actions.145 
The UNCAC reflects the growing international recognition of 
corruption and promotes anti-corruption culture. 146  Although the 
UNCAC is a product of political compromise and does not provide a 
mandatory framework to deal with private sector corruption, its measures 
at least attempt to curb corruption. 
 
B. The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions 
 
In the early 1990s, the issue of promoting international instruments 
that prohibit bribery of public officials became a priority for the United 
States government.147 As a result of joint efforts by the Departments of 
State, Commerce, and the Treasury, the issue of international bribery 
started to appear on the agendas of many international organizations.148 
Corruption and bribery of public officials were first internationally 
discussed in 1996 at the meeting of the G-7 heads of state in Lyon, 
France. 149  On November 21, 1997, the OECD Council of Ministers 
adopted the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions. 150  The Convention 
entered into force on February 15, 1999.151  Initially not very popular, the 
Convention gained momentum in the 2000s, and is currently ratified by 
thirty-nine countries. 152  These countries represent two-thirds of all 
international trade and three-quarters of all international investment.153 
The OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business 
Transactions keeps track of the implementation of the Convention and 
related instruments in the State parties. 
The Convention requires all member parties to criminalize bribery of 
foreign public officials—both active and passive forms—and eliminates                                                         
144 See Webb, supra note 138, at 214. 
145 U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., Rep. of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention 
Against Corruption on the Work of its First to Seventh Sessions, Addendum: Interpretative Notes for 
the Official Records (travaux preparatoires) of the Negotiation of the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption, add., A/58/422/Add.1, (Oct. 7, 2003), 
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/convention_corruption/session_7/422add1.pdf. 
146 See Argandoña 2007, supra note 125, at 482, 485; Webb, supra note 138, at 215. 
147 Peter W. Schroth, The United States and the International Bribery Conventions, 50 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 593, 610 (2001). 
148 Id. at 611 (mentioning that the OECD started to issue anti-bribery recommendations in 1994 
and citing to Recommendation of the Council on Bribery in International Business Transactions, 
OECD Doc. No. C(94)75/Final (27 May 1994), 33ILM 1389 (1994)). 
149 OFOSU-AMAAH, supra note 5, at 74. 
150 Id. 
151  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention: Entry into Force of the Convention, Dec. 17, 1997, (Feb. 12, 2013, 11:39 AM), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-briberyconvention/oecdanti-
briberyconventionentryintoforceoftheconvention.htm. 
152 Id. 
153 Misty Robinson, Global Approach to Anti-Bribery and Corruption, An Overview: Much 
Done, But a Lot More to Do . . . , 37 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 303, 306–7 (2012). 
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the tax deductibility of such bribes, but it does not cover private sector 
corruption.154 This does not mean, however, that OECD members turn a 
blind eye to this problem. The 2011 Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises contain a general prohibition of bribery by companies, 
including offering bribes to employees of business partners. 155  The 
Guidelines go beyond the scope of the FCPA, suggesting that companies 
should discourage even small, facilitating payments.156 
The OECD Convention is indicative of the growing attention of the 
international community to the problem of private sector corruption. 
Though not recognized in the Convention itself, private sector corruption 
is condemned in the guidelines and in other instruments issued in 
furtherance of the Convention. 
 
C. The Council of Europe’s Civil and Criminal Conventions on 
Corruption  
Around the same time the OECD started working on its anti-bribery 
convention, the Council of Europe started developing its own legal 
instruments to fight corruption. 157  A Multidisciplinary Group on 
Corruption was tasked with developing a comprehensive strategy of 
fighting corruption, which was endorsed in 1996. 158  After extensive 
consultations, the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption was opened 
for signatures on January 27, 1999,159 and was adopted on November 4, 
1999.160  
In May 1998, the Committee of Ministers, during the 102nd Session 
in Strasbourg, authorized the establishment of the Group of States 
against Corruption (GRECO).161  Established on May 1, 1999 GRECO 
                                                        
154  See generally Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
(entered into force on Feb. 15 1999), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf. 
155 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD GUIDELINES 
FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 47 (ed. 2011), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/internationalinvestment/guidelinesformultinationalenterprises/48004323.pd
f (“In particular, enterprises should: Not offer, promise or give undue pecuniary or other advantage 
to public officials or the employees of business partners.”). 
156 Id. at 47–48.   
157 Ofosu-Amaah, supra note 149, at 75 (1999). At the 19th Conference of the Council of 
Europe in Valetta, Malta in 1994, European officials called upon the member-countries to respond to 
the threat of corruption, which undermined democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. Id. 
158 Id. See also COUNCIL OF EUROPE, GROUP OF STATES AGAINST CORRUPTION: HISTORICAL 
BACKGROUND (Feb. 13, 2013, 11:45 AM), 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/general/2.%20Historical%20Background_en.asp. 
159 Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, ETS No. 173 
(1999), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/173.htm [hereinafter 
Criminal Law Convention]. 
160 Council of Europe, Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Nov. 4, 1999, ETS No. 174 
(1999), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/174.htm [hereinafter Civil 
Law Convention]. 
161 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 158. 
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currently includes fifty countries, including the U.S. 162 In addition to 
OECD and GRECO, on July 22, 2003, the Council of the European 
Union adopted Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA f, which aims at 
ensuring that corruption in the private sector is criminalized in all 
member states, requiring effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
penalties, including criminal liability of legal entities.163 
Both the Criminal and Civil Law Conventions on Corruption 
recognize “passive” (i.e. bribe-taking) and “active” (bribe-giving, 
solicitation) corruption. Articles 7 and 8 of the Criminal Convention on 
Corruption provide for mandatory criminalization of both active and 
passive bribery in the private sector.164 The Convention also calls for 
criminal liability for violations of accounting regulations intentionally 
made to disguise corrupt acts.165 
The Civil Convention on Corruption requires that all signatories 
establish effective remedies for people who have been harmed by 
corruption.166 Notably, the Convention establishes an affirmative defense 
of contributory negligence.167 If any part of a contract calls for corrupt 
acts, such a part should be declared null and void.168 However, a contract 
obtained by corrupt means is merely voidable.169 
 
D. Country Case Studies: United Kingdom, China, and Russia  
Corruption in the private sector has been addressed not only at the 
international level, but also at the national level. Besides joining various 
international anti-corruption treaties, some countries are amending their 
domestic legislation to address the corruption problem. This Section will 
highlight three recent and notable examples of such amendments: the 
United Kingdom, Russia, and China.  Recent legislative developments in 
these countries indicate a shift in attitudes toward corruption of the big 
players on the international trade scene. When compared to these 
changes, the FCPA seems unhelpful in providing guidance to U.S. 
companies because some of its provisions—like facilitating payments—
would be illegal in other countries. 
                                                         
162  COUNCIL OF EUROPE, GROUP OF STATES AGAINST CORRUPTION: MEMBERS AND 
OBSERVERS (Feb. 14, 2013, 1:48 PM), 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/general/members_en.asp. 
163 2003 O.J. (L. 192) (European Union Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of July 
22, 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003F0568:EN:NOT. 
164 Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 159, arts. 7–8. 
165 Id. at art. 14. 
166 Civil Law Convention, supra note 160, art. 1, April 11, 1999, art. 4 (outlining the prima 
facie case elements: (i) the defendant has committed or authorized the act of corruption, or failed to 
take reasonable steps to prevent the act of corruption; (ii) the plaintiff has suffered damage; and (iii) 
there is a causal link between the act of corruption and the damage). 
167 Id. at art. 6.  
168 Id. at art. 8. 
169 Id. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW       VOLUME 11 
  
113 
1. The U.K. Bribery Act of 2010  
In 2010, the U.K. adopted the Bribery Act, but it did not go into 
force until July 2012. 170  The Act covers bribe-giving, solicitation of 
bribes, and acceptance of bribes.171 The Act’s influence is so broad, in 
fact, that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce recognizes the Act as having 
the potential, under some circumstances, to influence U.S. companies.172 
One of the major innovations of the Act is that it criminalizes bribery in 
the private sector along with bribery of public officials.173 
The U.K. Bribery Act differs from the FCPA in its treatment of 
“grease” payments: the Act prohibits such payments, but gives 
companies an affirmative defense of having “adequate procedures” 
designed to deter bribery.174 The U.K. has issued guidelines on what are 
deemed “adequate procedures,” but plenty of ambiguity remains. 175  
Such an approach is likely to encourage companies to invest in 
corruption prevention strategies and programs.  On the other hand, the 
ambiguity of the Act might lead to economically inefficient levels of 
investment in such initiatives, creating “paper shields” instead of 
effective mechanisms for prevention and detection of corrupt practices.  
Another potential consequence is withdrawal from regions where 
corruption is common, similar to what scholars labeled as “unintended 
consequences” of the FCPA.176 Some scholars also raise concerns that 
corrupt businesspersons and officials will just invest more into hiding 
their criminal dealings, deflecting valuable resources from other 
productive activities.177 
 
2. Countries with Endemic Corruption: China and Russia  
Russia and China have both been characterized as countries with 
corruption so pervasive that it could potentially paralyze foreign 
investment projects or simply render such projects economically 
unprofitable.178 Both countries, in attempts to secure foreign investment                                                         
170  Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents [hereinafter U.K. Bribery Act]. 
171 Id. 
172 Andrew Weissmann & Alixandra Smith, Restoring Balance: Proposed Amendments to the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 11-14, (2010), available at 
http://ilr.iwssites.com/uploads/sites/1/restoringbalance_fcpa.pdf. 
173 U.K. Bribery Act, supra note 168, § 3(2). The section lists that to be actionable, the bribery 
should relate to “(a) any function of a public nature, (b) any activity connected with a business, (c) 
any activity performed in the course of a person’s employment, (d) any activity performed by or on 
behalf of a body of persons (whether corporate or unincorporate).”   
174 Id. § 7(2). 
175 Robinson, supra note 153, at 319. 
176 Spalding, supra note 63 at 358. 
177 See, e.g., Eric Engle, I Get By with a Little Help from my Friends? Understanding the U.K. 
Anti-Bribery Statute, by Reference to the OECD Convention and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
44 INT’L LAW. 1173, 1187 (2010) (highlighting certain anti-corruption statutes, however, criticism is 
applicable to any anti-bribery statute). 
178  See WILLIAM L. MILLER, ÅSE B. GRØDELAND, & TATYANA Y. KOSHECHKINA, A CULTURE 
OF CORRUPTION?: COPING WITH GOVERNMENT IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE (2001). 
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and fulfill their international commitments, recently adopted significant 
changes to their anti-corruption regulations.179 Russia signed and ratified 
the UNCAC in 2006,180 and on January 10, 2009, Russia’s new anti-
corruption legislation came into effect.181 After that, Russia applied for 
accession to the OECD Convention and became a full member of 
GRECO. 182  As a consequence, new federal statutes that criminalize 
corruption in both the public and the private sectors went into effect.183 
The statutes provide for administrative liability for corrupt acts 
committed “on behalf or in the interests” of a company.184 Though there 
is no criminal liability for corporations,185 individuals can be sentenced 
for up to twelve years in prison and fined up to 100 times the bribe 
amount, not to exceed $500 million RUR (approximately $17 million 
USD).186 In addition, Russian anti-corruption laws have the same extra-
territorial reach as the FCPA and the U.K. Anti-Bribery Act. 187 
Moreover, Russia recognizes neither the U.K. “compliance” defense nor 
the U.S. “facilitating payments” exception, which makes Russia’s 
statutory framework one of the most demanding in the world.188 Because 
of this, American companies relying on the FCPA for guidance on doing 
business in Russia are no longer insulated from prosecution for 
“ministerial” payments and should take steps to bring their compliance 
programs up to speed with Russian regulations. 
Chinese anti-corruption legislation has undergone significant 
changes as well. China joined the UNCAC in 2006.189 In May 2011, 
China’s new anti-corruption legislation criminalizing both active and 
passive corruption took effect.190 191 This legislation is significant since 
private sector corruption and bribing public officials (both domestic and                                                         
179 See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, BRIBE PAYERS INDEX 2011, 12–13 (2011). 
180  U. N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, U. N. CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION 
SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION STATUS AS OF 5 SEPTEMBER 2014 (Sep. 26, 2014, 3:25 PM), 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html. 
181 UGOLOVNYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [UK RF] [Criminal Code] art. 201-04 (Russ.) 
(abuse of position in private enterprises), art. 285-93 (abuse of position in public service); 
Federal’nyi Zakon RF O Protivodeystvii Korruptsii [Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Anti-
Corruption Measures], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] Dec. 30 2008 (available at 
http://www.russian-criminal-code.com). 
182 Robinson, supra note 151, at 317. 
183 UGOLOVNYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [UK RF] [Criminal Code] (Russ.) art. 201-04 
(abuse of position in private enterprises), art. 285-93 (abuse of position in public service). 
184 KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII OB ADMINISTRATIVNYKH PRAVONARUSHENIIAKH [KOAP 
RF] [Code of Administrative Violations] art. 19.28. 
185 Corporate criminal liability simply does not exist under Russian law (author’s note).  
186 Robinson, supra note 153, at 316. 
187 Id. 
188 See id. 
189 U. N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 178. 
190 Amanda Turnill, et al., What to Do when You Suspect Corruption: Disclosure Obligations 
and Enforcement Processes in the UK, the US, Australia and China, PRACTICAL LAW (Oct. 11, 
2014, 10:10PM), www.practicallaw.com/2-520-1484. 
191 See Xíng fǎ (刑法) [Criminal Code] (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997) ch. III, § 1, arts. 163, 164, ch. VIII, arts. 385, 386, 389 
(China), translated in Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (Jan. 15, 2013) available at 
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/newLaws/criminalLawENG.php. 
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foreign) are equally recognized under the law.192 As with Russian laws, 
Chinese laws do not have criminal liability for corporations (though such 
corporations can be fined)193 and corporate officials directly involved or 
responsible for the illegal conduct can be imprisoned.194 For large-scale 
commercial bribery, a person can be punished by a minimum sentence of 
five years and have his or her property confiscated. 195  Chinese law, 
however, provides mitigated sentences for voluntary reporting and 
cooperation during investigation.196 
China and Russia, with the combined population of over 1.5 billion 
people,197 represent a big market for U.S. companies. Thus, changes in 
their anti-corruption regulations inevitably affect any U.S. corporations 
doing business in these countries. This new generation of anti-corruption 
statutes, modeled after the UNCAC, has the same extra-territorial reach 
as the FCPA, but covers other forms of corrupt conduct outside of 
bribery, including corruption in the private sector. 198  Thus, corporate 
managers should not lightly dismiss new anti-corruption initiatives in 
developing markets; prosecution always remains a possibility, even if the 
current number of cases is small.199  
  To illustrate the magnitude of the risk of prosecution, in 2012 alone, 
more than 7,000 people were sentenced by Russian courts for various 
corruption offenses. 200  Notably, there are already some examples of 
private sector corruption cases. For instance, an IKEA Russia employee 
has recently been tried and convicted for aiding and abetting in soliciting 
a bribe of 6.5 million rubles to renew a lease contract with an IKEA 
lessee.201 Similarly, anti-corruption initiatives in other countries might 
pick up pace with the development of international cooperation 
instruments. 
                                                         
192 Id. ch. III, § 1, arts. 163, 164, ch. VIII, arts. 385, 386, 389. 
193 Id. ch. VIII, art. 393. 
194 Id. ch. VIII, arts. 386, 383 (providing punishment for up to five years in prison if the 
circumstances are serious and the amount of the bribe is relatively large; domestic public officials 
accepting large bribes can be sentenced from ten years to a lifetime in prison, or even death penalty, 
with confiscation of all their property). 
195 Id. ch. III, art.163. 
196 Id. ch. III, art.163, ch. VIII, art. 390. 
197 According to the Population Reference Bureau, the population of China in 2014 is 1,364 
million people, and the population of Russia is 144 million, totaling together for a 1,508 million 
people.  2014 World Population Data Sheet, Population Reference Bureau, 
http://www.prb.org/pdf14/2014-world-population-data-sheet_eng.pdf. 
198 See supra notes 189-196 and the related text. 
199 Nichols, supra note 3, at 359. 
200 Сергей Иванов рассказал о “реальных посадках” коррупционеров [Sergey Ivanov on 
“real sentencings” for corruption], РБК (Feb. 14, 2013, 3:49 PM), 
http://top.rbc.ru/politics/14/01/2013/840081.shtml (in Russian). 
201  Samuel Rubenfeld, Russia Accuses IKEA Manager of Extorting a Bribe, WALL ST. J. 
CORRUPTION CURRENTS BLOG (December 19, 2011, 4:11 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-
currents/2011/12/19/russia-accuses-ikea-manager-of-extorting-a-bribe/; See Andrew E. Kramer, Ikea 
Tries to Build Public Case Against Russian Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/12/business/global/12ikea.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. This case 
is especially interesting because IKEA was famous for taking an uncompromising stand against 
corruption in Russia and even stopped all new business projects in Russia when faced with 
unprecedented levels of corruption among government employees. 
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IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
 
This Section proposes three approaches the U.S. Congress can take 
to tackle the problem of private sector corruption: (1) adopt an FCPA-
like statute criminalizing private sector corruption or amend the FCPA; 
(2) leave legislation in its current state and rely on the courts to solve 
arising problems; or (3) adopt a hybrid solution: extend the FCPA’s 
accounting/reporting provisions and give a private right of action to 
victims of corruption. While each solution has its benefits and 
drawbacks, it might be premature and inefficient to criminalize private 
sector corruption altogether. On the other hand, it is also clear that some 
steps have to be taken to give the market clear signals that unethical 
business practices will no longer be tolerated, be it in the United States or 
abroad. If everything is left as it is now, corporations will still be tempted 
to act corruptly in private dealings because there is no punishment and no 
way for competitors or victims to recover damages through litigation. 
This Section advocates the hybrid solution—incorporating both a private 
right of action and heightened reporting requirements—because the idea 
of criminalizing private sector corruption has no widespread support yet, 
but the problem is big enough to turn society’s attention to it. 
 
A. Adoption of an FCPA-like Statute for Private Sector Corruption 
 
The first solution is the most apparent one. Since the U.S. is a State 
party to the UNCAC and is also a full member of GRECO, it should 
follow the U.N. Convention and adopt a federal statute—or amend the 
FCPA—criminalizing private sector corruption. Though criminalization 
of private sector corruption is considered to be a non-mandatory 
offense,202 meaning that State parties only need to consider criminalizing 
such offenses, some countries have already taken steps in this 
direction.203 This statute would be a good vehicle for such legislative 
changes. It already has general books and records provisions complying 
with Article 12 of the UNCAC, and the only amendment necessary 
would be inclusion of private sector corruption into its anti-bribery 
provisions. Most importantly, unlike existing federal statutes, the FCPA 
has extra-territorial reach.204 This solution would be in line with some 
leaders’ congressional intent when adopting the FCPA.205 
This solution, however, has quite a few potential drawbacks. First, 
criminalizing private sector corruption would likely be highly unpopular 
                                                        
202 U. N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, DIVISION FOR TREATY AFFAIRS, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION 95 (2nd 
rev. ed., 2012), http://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/CoC_LegislativeGuide.pdf. 
203 See Part III.D. (stating that the U.K., China, Russia, and many other countries adopted 
comprehensive legislation dealing with private and public corruption alike). 
204 See Part II.B.2. 
205 H.R. REP. NO. 95-640 at 19 (stating that simply adding accounting provisions would not 
deter bribery, but that criminal sanctions would). 
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with corporations. 206  In 2010, the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal 
Research published a paper on FCPA reform, 207  which urges the 
government to ease the FCPA’s grip on companies by adding a 
“compliance defense” and by defining “foreign officials” more 
narrowly. 208  In response to these and other concerns, the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) released its Resource Guide to the FCPA on 
November 14, 2012.209 The guide affirms previous positions taken by the 
government: though compliance is not a defense, it is a relevant factor to 
consider in deciding penalties, 210 and “foreign officials” still includes 
employees of “state-controlled or state-owned” enterprises.211 There is 
no reason to think that the government would digress from these views if 
it were to decide to criminalize corruption in the private sector through 
the FCPA. It is very likely that there would be similar push-back from 
the business community. 
Sweetening the pill by allowing the compliance defense, similar to 
the U.K. Bribery Act, might be a logical step should the FCPA be 
amended to cover private sector bribery cases. First, employees 
sometimes act corruptly despite existence of business conduct codes and 
extensive training programs simply because the value of personal gains 
for them is higher than the chances of being prosecuted.212 For example, 
in a recent case, a Morgan Stanley employee responsible for the 
company’s real estate business in China pled guilty to bribing Chinese 
public officials.213 The employee received seven trainings on the FCPA 
from Morgan Stanley in addition to at least thirty-five reminders to 
comply with the statute. 214  “Morgan Stanley’s compliance personnel 
regularly monitored transactions, randomly audited particular employees, 
transactions, and business units, and tested to identify illicit 
payments.”215 In the Morgan Stanley case, existence of extensive anti-
corruption policies, regulations, and enforcement mechanisms within a 
corporation was not enough to deter the employee from engaging in 
corrupt practices. So far, it remains the only case where the DOJ decided 
to not prosecute the company and to charge only the employee.216                                                           
206 The FCPA has been criticized as being a competitive disadvantage to U.S. companies doing 
business abroad. See supra text accompanying notes 58-63. 
207  U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL RESEARCH, RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 5 (Oct. 27, 2010), available at 
http://ilr.iwssites.com/uploads/sites/1/restoringbalance_fcpa.pdf. 
208 Id. at 11–14, 24–27 (respectively). 
209 CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ENFORCEMENT DIV., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A 
RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 20 (2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf [hereinafter THE FCPA GUIDE]. 
210 Id. at 54. 
211 Id. at 20. 
212 See Id. at 61. 
213 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former Morgan Stanley Managing Director Pleads Guilty 
for Role in Evading Internal Controls Required by FCPA (Apr. 25, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-crm-534.html. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216  Extensive compliance efforts are one of the factors the DOJ considers when deciding 
whether to prosecute a case or not. See THE FCPA GUIDE, supra note 209. 
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Second, legislators should consider that many people still think that 
corruption in the private sector is a less serious offense than in the public 
sector because there is no direct loss of taxpayer monies and because the 
harm to society is less apparent.217 The effects of corruption and fraud on 
the corporate level, however, may be quite tangible. Sometimes 
employees commit corrupt acts to advance the goals of their 
organization, and sometimes they act corruptly just for personal gains.218 
Both types of corrupt conduct result in the company “spinning its 
wheels” to regain the lost money while its competitors fully reinvest their 
profits—or pay larger dividends to their shareholders—and generate 
more income.219 
Finally, introducing a compliance defense for private sector 
corruption offenses would incentivize corporations to invest in effective 
compliance programs. Providing such incentives would thus increase 
compliance with the statutory requirements.220 Corruption, even when 
committed to promote corporate interests, is not costless. Compliance 
and corruption programs can save corporations from costs associated 
with corruption, such as defending anti-corruption lawsuits.221 Providing 
a compliance defense gives corporations an extra incentive to invest in 
such programs. 
Amending the FCPA, or introducing a similar statute criminalizing 
private sector corruption, would likely be a step welcomed by many 
international organizations. Though it may cause an outcry among 
American corporations, “sweetening the pill” by allowing a compliance 
defense, at least in private sector corruption cases, may ultimately benefit 
American corporations. This is because a compliance defense will likely 
increase overall compliance and encourage investment in corresponding 
corporate programs.222 
 
                                                        
217  See Green, supra note 90, at 47, table 2 (2012). Authors assert that though corrupt 
government officials are still perceived as more blameworthy and deserving of higher punishment, 
almost 80% of respondents think that corrupt conduct of corporate board members should be treated 
as a crime. Id. at 46. 
218 Conan C. Albrecht et al., The Debilitating Effects of Fraud in Organizations, in CRIME AND 
CORRUPTION IN ORGANIZATIONS: WHY IT OCCURS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 164 (Ronald J. 
Burke et al. eds., 2010). 
219 Id. at 166. Authors give General Motors as an example. General Motors suffered a loss of 
$436 million from dealership fraud back in the 1980s. To regain the losses, General Motors would 
have to generate $436 billion dollars in additional revenue, assuming that the profit margin at that 
time was around 10%.   
220 This is one of the reasons advanced by the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform for 
introduction of compliance defense. See U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 
57, at 13.   
221 See Palazzolo, supra note 56 for costs of litigation estimates. 
222  For an example of a recent case where a company avoided FCPA liability because it 
provided its employees with substantial FCPA training, see supra notes 212-216 and related text. 
The author thinks it is a sufficient incentive to invest in compliance training. 
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B. Leaving Everything “As Is”  
Another potential solution is to leave the situation “as is.” The U.S. 
already has federal statutes to prosecute private sector corruption,223 and 
many corporations already have voluntarily invested in business conduct 
training and corruption prevention because they understand the benefits 
of compliance programs.224 One might argue that there is no need to 
impose additional sanctions and requirements, especially in such a 
nuanced and sensitive area as business relations between private parties. 
Unlike government agencies that act within strict limitations of statutory-
defined budgets, corporations have more freedom to align compensation 
with economic results or employees’ conduct. This freedom may be 
enough in itself to lower the level of private sector corruption. 
Currently, the DOJ considers the existence and effectiveness of a 
compliance program as one of the relevant factors in determining 
whether to charge a corporation and in negotiating plea bargains or other 
agreements.225 The DOJ recognizes that effective compliance programs 
should be tailored to individual companies’ needs and there is no “one 
size fits all” solution.226 Yet, certain hallmarks are expected, including 
formal policies, training, senior management commitment, risk 
assessment, disciplinary measures, confidential reporting, and others.227 
Many positive examples of collective business actions aimed at 
reducing corruption exist. One such example of collective business 
actions focusing on the reduction of corruption is pharmaceutical 
industry. The medical device and pharmaceutical industries have long 
been considered as exemplifying industries with a high intrinsic level of 
corruption,228 especially for industry-sponsored clinical trials of medical 
devices.229 Such corruption occurred because companies sought ways to 
maximize shareholder results, and some doctors conducting trials 
received unethical incentives to provide more favorable data.230 The need 
for unbiased opinions pushed the industry to develop and promote an                                                         
223 See Part II.B. 
224 In 1981, the General Accounting Office reported that one of the outcomes of the FCPA was 
the introduction of company-level conduct codes. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPACT OF 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ON U.S. BUSINESS 6 (Mar. 4, 1981), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/140/132199.pdf. 
225 THE FCPA GUIDE, supra note 209, at 53. 
226 Id. at 57. 
227 Id. at 57–62. 
228 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, The Business Case Against Corruption 2 (2011), available at 
https://members.weforum.org/pdf/paci/BusinessCaseAgainstCorruption.pdf. The pharmaceutical 
industry, in particular, has been known for creating fake academic journals and submitting falsified 
articles to academic journals and other publications. Ronald J. Burke, Crime and Corruption in 
Organization, in CRIME AND CORRUPTION IN ORGANIZATIONS: WHY IT OCCURS AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT, 10–12 (Ronald J. Burke et al. eds., 2010). 
229 Waleed Brinjikji and David F. Kallmes, Editorial, How Everybody Wins When Playing by 
the Rules: The Benefits of Investigator-Initiated Industry-Sponsored Clinical Trials, 32 AM. J. 
NEURORADIOLOGY 427, 427 (2011) (reporting that industry-sponsored clinical studies of devices 
developed by the industry have a significantly greater probability of demonstrating positive results 
than studies of their non-industry-sponsored counterparts). 
230 Id. at 428. Such incentives included “financial awards, material awards, or promise of future 
research funding.” Id. 
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industry-wide code of conduct addressing interactions with healthcare 
professionals. 231  The Advanced Medical Technology Association 
(“AdvaMed”) has created a code of ethics to govern the interactions with 
health care professionals.232 A voluntary certification process enforces 
compliance with the Code. 233  AdvaMed keeps an online list of 
companies who follow the Code and pass the certification.234 Almost all 
large medical device companies (such as Abbot, Allergan, CareFusion, 
and Johnson & Johnson) are on the list.235 This list may create necessary 
peer pressure for smaller companies to opt in and play by the rules. The 
AdvaMed Code seems to be an effective attempt at an instrument of 
industry self-regulation.   
However, relying on self-regulation and existing anti-corruption 
instruments might not be the optimal solution. Without external 
reinforcement, companies lack the incentive to create the corruption-free 
environment expected of them when dealing with business partners in 
regions with stricter corruption regulation.236 Additionally, even for the 
many businesses who do have conduct codes that prohibit self-dealing, 
commercial bribery, and other practices, rogue employees might not be 
deterred from unethical conduct, 237  especially given difficulties in 
prosecuting private sector corruption cases involving international 
trade. 238  Such voluntary instruments may therefore fail to induce 
employee compliance 239 because simply adopting an ethics code fails 
without various organizational structures to support it. 240 Absent such 
support, employees use various strategies to rationalize their corrupt 
conduct,241 and most of them do not even perceive their actions as being 
corrupt.242                                                         
231  Paul A. LaViolette, Medical Devices and Conflict of Interest: Unique Issues and an 
Industry Code to Address Them, 74 CLEV. CLINIC J. OF MED. S26 (supp. 2, 2007). 
232 ADVAMED CODE OF ETHICS ON INTERACTIONS WITH HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS, 2 
(2008), available at http://advamed.org/res/112/advamed-code-of-ethics-on-interactions-with-health-
care-professionals 
233  Code Certification Program, ADVAMED (Feb. 14, 2013, 4:21 PM), 
http://advamed.org/issues/2/certification-program. 
234 Id. at 2. 
235AdvaMed, ADVAMED CODE CERTIFYING COMPANIES, http://advamed.org/issues/33/code-
certifying-companies (last visited Oct. 10, 2014). 
236 See David Hess, Combating Corruption Through Corporate Transparency, 21 MINN. J. 
INT'L L. 42 (2012). 
237  See supra notes 212–216 and accompanying text. Rose-Ackerman notes that many 
individuals express strong norms of moral behavior but do not apply these norms to their work life. 
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Measuring Private Sector Corruption, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center, 
p. 3 (Sept. 2007), http://www.u4.no/publications/measuring-private-sector-corruption/. See also 
Albrecht, supra note 218 at 171. People use various rationalizations to feel good about themselves, 
so slipping into corruption becomes relatively easy when an opportunity and need present 
themselves. Id. at 171–72. 
238 See Part III.A–B. 
239 See supra notes 212–216 and accompanying text for an example. 
240 Vikas Anand et al., Business as Usual: The Acceptance and Perpetuation of Corruption in 
Organizations, 18 ACAD. OF MGMT. EXEC. 39, 49 (2004). 
241 Id. at 41. Authors list a number of strategies, such as denial of responsibility, denial of 
injury, denial of victim, social weighting, appeal to higher loyalties, metaphor of the leger. Id. at 41 
table 1. 
242 Id. at 40. 
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Thus, even though companies have incentives to invest in 
compliance programs and internal investigations, and though there are 
some successful examples of industry self-regulation efforts, these 
incentives do not guarantee compliance and they leave enough room for 
misconduct. The lack of sanctions provides a powerful temptation to cut 
corners in the name of competition, while enforcement of self-regulation 
becomes even more problematic because courts interpret current laws 
narrowly.243 
 
C. Hybrid Solution  
Another possible solution to the problem of private sector corruption 
in international commerce—and the one this Comment recommends—
stands as middle ground between criminalization and the free-market 
approaches. This solution includes reforming the FCPA to include 
specific reporting requirements on private corruption and giving the 
victims of such corruption a private right of action to recover damages. 
The first component of this solution—extending FCPA reporting 
requirements to include prohibition of misreporting various forms of 
private sector corruption—creates a strong incentive for companies to 
create and enforce zero-tolerance corruption policies. This plan includes 
a total ban on facilitating payments and suspicious “rebates” and fees. In 
fact, most companies that fall under FCPA accounting provisions already 
have similar policies in place, 244  making it unlikely to create any 
inconveniences or disadvantages for them. This solution follows the 
spirit of the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank changes.245 Additionally, 
disclosure might help civil society organizations, such as Transparency 
International, in independently evaluating corruption prevention 
programs and “policing” deviations. 
Extending FCPA reporting requirements to include public reporting 
creates another benefit: companies will be able to analyze policies in 
place at peer companies and share and discuss best practices. This, in 
turn, will lead to cheaper ways of creating effective compliance systems. 
A combination of new public reporting requirements and the defense 
of having an effective corruption prevention system in place (akin to the 
U.K. Bribery Act) is also a sensible suggestion. 246  This combination 
would give companies both an incentive to invest in such programs and 
an assurance that the authorities will consider their efforts in making a 
decision to charge the company with corruption.                                                         
243 See Parts A.2 and B for a more thorough discussion. 
244 New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ, the two largest U.S. stock exchanges, require all 
listed companies to adopt and disclose mandatory code of conduct that applies to both employees 
and directors.  The impact of Code of Conducts on Corporate Culture: Measuring the Immeasurable, 
LRN, at 1 (2006), http://www.ethics.org/files/u5/LRNImpactofCodesofConduct.pdf.  Adding 
provisions relating to zero-tolerance policy for commercial bribery to the existing codes is not likely 
to result in significant expenses. 
245 See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text. 
246 See supra notes 172–173 and accompanying text. 
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However, companies are not likely to be enthusiastic about new 
public reporting requirements. After all, more reporting means more 
expense. Additional reporting does not guarantee that companies will fail 
to hide the old corrupt culture. 247 Further, the reporting requirements 
under the FCPA cover only “issuers,” not all the companies.248 Publicly 
traded “issuers,” however, are usually leaders in their industries.249 If the 
new public reporting requirements require this class of companies to 
report any suspicious payments to private counterparties, it will 
inevitably affect their supply chains. Thus, the proposed changes will 
affect medium and small companies as well. 
The second component of this solution would give a private right of 
action to competitors or victims to recover damages. Such a right should 
exist independent of the SEC’s ability to penalize companies for 
violations of reporting requirements. This component is justified in the 
context of purely private nature of conduct in commercial bribery and 
private sector corruption cases.   
A private right of action is more efficient than criminal prosecution 
because criminal prosecution of bribery requires tremendous budget 
expenditures. Criminal sanctions, though a strong deterring factor, do not 
necessarily strike the optimal balance between efficient allocation of 
societal resources and crime prevention. Some scholars advocate for a 
private right of action in this area because it will give the competitors an 
incentive to “police” the market.250 Many view a private right of action 
as a more efficient way to combat private corruption.251 Private citizens 
would have the same rights as government to compel disclosure, but, 
unlike in criminal cases, the standard of proof in civil cases will likely be 
lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard used in criminal 
cases.252   
Of course, this solution raises the issue of frivolous lawsuits by 
competitors. After all, lack of express private right of action has not 
stopped competitors and shareholders in bringing lawsuits for bribery of 
foreign public officials under other legal theories.253 Yet, some scholars 
describe private right of action as a “dramatically effective source of                                                         
247 Anand et al., supra note 240, at 49. See also Klaw, supra note 13 at 315–19 (discussing that 
the recent changes to reporting requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
were not effective in preventing corruption). 
248 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
249 Usually, public offering of securities alone requires significant monetary expenses. See 
Considering an IPO? The Costs of Going and Being Public May Surprise You, PwC at 1 (July 
2012), http://www.pwc.com/en_us/us/transaction-services/publications/assets/pwc-cost-of-ipo.pdf.  
Being traded on a public stock exchange is generally available only to larger companies having 
significant market shares. 
250 Klaw, supra note 13, at 358–61. Klaw also gives an interesting analysis why Congress 
rejected the idea of giving competitors a private right of action when enacting the FCPA in 1977. Id. 
at 310–11. 
251 Paul D. Carrington, Enforcing International Corrupt Practices Law, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
129, 150–51 (2010). 
252 Id. Carrington discusses proceedings under the federal False Claims Act, but the same logic 
applies to the proposed amendments to the FCPA. Id. 
253 For a brief overview of such cases, see Klaw, supra note 13, at 359–60.  
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deterrence and appropriate retribution.” 254  Klaw makes the following 
argument in support of private right of action under the FCPA: 
 
Moreover, criminological research shows that likelihood of 
detection and subsequent sanction, rather than severity of 
sanction is the key determinant to deterrence. Civil suits are thus 
a particularly apt deterrent, because competitors are likely to 
bring them (making the costs of defending litigation a sanction in 
itself) and they require a lower standard of proof than criminal 
cases.255 
Thus, the combination of a threat of private lawsuits together with 
market incentives to maintain a company’s reputation would indeed be a 
powerful tool deterring corruption, even without criminalizing it. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
  
Despite serious criticism, the introduction of the FCPA made 
companies treat issues of corruption and bribery abroad more seriously. 
A growing trend in the global community condemns and criminalizes 
private sector corruption. The United States does not expressly regulate 
private sector corruption at the federal level. A long tradition of 
criminalizing commercial bribery exists at the state level, but these 
statutes have limited effect on the international trade transactions. 
Although competitors can bring lawsuits under different legal theories 
against companies that obtain business by means of corruption or 
bribery, such attempts have had limited success so far. 
This situation calls for definitive steps to be taken to prohibit private 
sector corruption, including commercial bribery, at the federal level. 
Only comprehensive federal legislative changes will be able to fill the 
void in the regulations that previously allowed transnational commercial 
bribery to slip through the cracks. The U.S. cannot rely on the efforts of 
the U.N. or other countries to enact such legislation and punish U.S. 
companies for their own misdeeds abroad. 
At the same time, given the political discourse and the attitude of the 
business community toward the FCPA, criminalizing private sector 
bribery is premature. Leaving everything in its current state, however, 
also fails as a rational solution. Overreliance on the efficiency of the free 
market has led to many problems in the past and provides no guarantee 
that the free market will be able to deal with private corruption 
efficiently. After all, corruption, by definition, distorts markets. 
Amending the FCPA’s accounting and reporting provisions to include 
reporting requirements for the private sector corruption provides the 
most sensible solution at the moment. It would promote the exchange of                                                         
254 Id. at 359. 
255 Id. at 360. 
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best practices and will allow civil society organizations to “police” 
compliance with those provisions. Creating a private right of action for 
the victims of corruption will help the investigation and prosecution such 
allegations without over-extending public resources. 
As the case in Wabtec, if no measures are taken, many companies 
will remain tempted to simply buy the loyalty of local officials and 
business partners in developing countries rather than competing by 
providing better goods and services at better prices. Reform should begin 
at home to make corporations more accountable for this trillion-dollar 
problem. 
